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    Thursday, December 01, 2005

    Orwell would be proud: Iraq "Victory" Strategy 2005

    • Iraq is the central front in the global war on terror. Failure in Iraq will embolden terrorists and expand their reach; success in Iraq will deal them a decisive and crippling blow. (1)

    • The fate of the greater Middle East – which will have a profound and lasting impact on American security – hangs in the balance. (1)

    • Iraq would become a safe haven from which terrorists could plan attacks against America, American interests abroad, and our allies. (1)

    • Middle East reformers would never again fully trust American assurances of support for democracy and human rights in the region – a historic opportunity lost. (1)

    • The enemy is a combination of rejectionists, Saddamists, and terrorists affiliated with or inspired by Al Qaida. Distinct but integrated strategies are required to defeat each element. (1)

    • Isolate enemy elements from those who can be won over to the political process by countering false propaganda and demonstrating to all Iraqis that they have a stake in a democratic Iraq; (1)

    • Clear areas of enemy control by remaining on the offensive, killing and capturing enemy fighters and denying them safe-haven; (2)

    • Reform Iraq’s economy, which in the past has been shaped by war, dictatorship, and sanctions, so that it can be self-sustaining in the future; (2)

    • Our strategy is working. (2)

    • It is not realistic to expect a fully functioning democracy, able to defeat its enemies and peacefully reconcile generational grievances, to be in place less than three years after Saddam was finally removed from power. (2)

    • Our mission in Iraq is to win the war. Our troops will return home when that mission is complete. (2)

    • As the central front in the global war on terror, success in Iraq is an essential element in the long war against the ideology that breeds international terrorism. (3)

    • The war on terrorism is the defining challenge of our generation, just as the struggle against communism and fascism were challenges of the generations before. (4)

    • The terrorists regard Iraq as the central front in their war against humanity. And we must recognize Iraq as the central front in our war on terror. (4)

    • Osama Bin Laden has declared that the “third world war…is raging” in Iraq, and it will end there, in “either victory and glory, or misery and humiliation.” (4)

    • Bin Laden’s deputy Ayman al-Zawahiri has declared Iraq to be “the place for the greatest battle,” where he hopes to “expel the Americans” and then spread “the jihad wave to the secular countries neighboring Iraq.” (4)

    • Al Qaida in Iraq, led by Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, has openly declared that “we fight today in Iraq, and tomorrow in the Land of the Two Holy Places, and after there the west.” (4)

    • What happens in Iraq will influence the fate of the Middle East for generations to come, with a profound impact on our own national security. (4)

    • Ceding ground to terrorists in one of the world’s most strategic regions will threaten the world’s economy and America’s security, growth, and prosperity, for decades to come. An emerging democracy in Iraq will change the regional status quo that for decades has bred alienation and spawned the transnational terrorism that targets us today. (4)

    • The terrorists’ perverse ideology is countered by the advance of freedom and the recognition that all people have the right to live under democracy and the rule of law, free from oppression and fear, with hope and optimism for the future. 4

    • Helping the people of Iraq is the morally right thing to do – America does not abandon its friends in the face of adversity. Helping the people of Iraq, however, is also in our own national interest. (4)

    • If we and our Iraqi partners prevail in Iraq, we will have made America: safer: … stronger: … more certain of its future: … (4-5)

    • [If we fail, Iraq will become] A safe haven for terrorists as Afghanistan once was, only this time in some of the world’s most strategic territory, with vast natural resources to exploit and to use to fund future attacks. (5)

    • [If we Fail, the terrorists will have] Won a decisive victory over the United States, vindicating their tactics of beheadings, suicide bombings, and ruthless intimidation of civilians, inviting more deadly attacks against Americans and other free people across the globe. (5)

    • Placed the American people in greater danger by destabilizing a vital region, weakening our friends, and clearing the way for terrorist attacks here at home. The terrorists will be emboldened in their belief that America cannot stand and fight, but will cut and run in the face of adversity. (5)

    • Rejectionists are the largest group. They are largely Sunni Arabs who have not embraced the shift from Saddam Hussein’s Iraq to a democratically governed state. (6)

    • The terrorists have identified Iraq as central to their global aspirations. For that reason, terrorists and extremists from all parts of the Middle East and North Africa have found their way to Iraq and made common cause with indigenous religious extremists and former members of Saddam’s regime. This group cannot be won over and must be defeated – killed or captured – through sustained counterterrorism operations. (7)

    • Despite their competing goals, these disparate enemy elements share a common operational concept: Intimidate, coerce, or convince the Iraqi public not to support the transition to democracy by persuading them that the nascent Iraqi government is not competent and will be abandoned by a Coalition that lacks the stomach for this fight. (7; emphasis added)

    • Weaken the Coalition’s resolve, and our resolve at home, through barbaric mass-casualty attacks, public slaughter of Iraqi civilians and hostages, infliction of casualties on Coalition forces, and use of the media to spread propaganda and intimidate adversaries. (7)

    • Saddam Hussein devastated Iraq, wrecked its economy, ruined its infrastructure, and destroyed its human capital.

    • … Iran and Syria have failed to provide support to Iraq’s new government and have in many ways actively undermined it. (10)

    • Many of Iraq’s communities remain skeptical of the central government and nervous about the creation of an Iraqi state where power is concentrated in Baghdad. (11)

    • Arbitrary deadlines or timetables for withdrawal of Coalition forces – divorced from conditions on the ground – would be irresponsible and deadly, as they would suggest to the terrorists, Saddamists, and rejectionists that they can simply wait to win. (12)

    • GDP; per capita GDP; inflation; electricity generated and delivered; barrels of oil produced and exported; and numbers of businesses opened. (13)

    • Most rejectionists can over time be persuaded to no longer seek the privileges of dictatorship – and in exchange will embrace the rewards of democratic stability. (14)

    • Commitment to democracy – rather than other forms of governance – not only isconsistent with our values, but is essential to keeping the long-oppressed Shi’a and Kurds as our partners in Iraq. (15)

    • Signs of a vibrant political life are sprouting. The constitutional drafting committee received more than 500,000 public comments on various provisions. More than 100 newspapers freely discuss political events every day in Iraq. Campaign posters are displayed openly and in increasing number in most of Iraq’s major cities. (16)

    • Increasingly robust Iraqi political institutions expose the falsity of enemy propaganda that Iraq is “under occupation,” with decisions being made by non-Iraqis. Such institutions also provide peaceful means for reconciliation and bridging divides. (15)

    • Hundreds of judges have been trained since the fall of Saddam Hussein. (17)

    • The United Nations Security Council has enacted a series of unanimous resolutions that authorize the presence of Coalition forces and anchor the Iraqi political process with international backing. In November, the United Nations Security Council passed resolution 1637, which – at the request of the Iraqi government – unanimously extended authorization for the Coalition forces to operate in Iraq. (17)

    • In September, NATO inaugurated a new military staff college in Baghdad that will eventually train more than 1,000 senior Iraqi officers each year. (21)

    • Compensation for civilians hurt by counterterrorism operations and the restoration of some economic vibrancy to areas formerly under terrorist control can help ease resentment and win over an otherwise suspicious population. (23)

    • Oil production increased from an average of 1.58 million barrels per day in 2003, to an average of 2.25 million barrels per day in 2004. Iraq presently is producing on average 2.1 million barrels per day, a slight decrease due to terrorist attacks on infrastructure, dilapidated and insufficient infrastructure, and poor maintenance practices. We are helping the Iraqis address each challenge so the country can have a dependable income stream. (23)

    • Iraq’s nominal GDP recovered from its nadir of $13.6 billion in 2003 to $25.5 billion in 2004, led primarily by the recovery of the oil sector. According to the International Monetary Fund, GDP is expected to grow in real terms by 3.7 percent in 2005 and nearly 17 percent in 2006. (23)

    • Iraq’s exchange rate has been stable since the introduction of its new currency in 2004 and remains so at approximately 1,475 Iraqi Dinar/$1. A stable currency has allowed the Central Bank of Iraq to better manage inflationary pressures. (23)

    • According to the IMF, per capita GDP, an important measure of poverty, rebounded to $942 in 2004 (after dropping to $518 in 2003), and is expected to continue to increase to over $1,000 in 2005. (23)

    • Since April 2003, Iraq has registered more than 30,000 new businesses, and its stock market (established in April 2004) currently lists nearly 90 companies with an average daily trading volume over $100 million (from January to May 2005), up from an average of $86 million in 2004. (23-4)

    • Iraq is rejoining the international financial community: it is on the road to WTO accession, has completed its first IMF economic health report card in 25 years, and secured an agreement that could lead to as much as 80 percent reduction from the Paris Club for Saddam-era debt. (24)

    • At the October 2003 Madrid International Donors Conference, donors other than the United States pledged over $13 billion in assistance for the reconstruction of Iraq, including $8 billion from foreign governments and $5.5 billion in lending from the World Bank and International Monetary Fund, to be disbursed from 2004 through 2007. (24)

    • Today in Iraq there are more than 3 million cell phone subscribers. In 2003 there were virtually none. (24)

    • Facilitating investment in Iraq’s oil sector to increase production from the current 2.1 million barrels per day to more than 5 million per day; (24)

    • Preventing, repairing, and overcoming terrorist and insurgent attacks against vital infrastructure, especially electricity and oil related nodes; (24)

    • Creating a payment system and a banking infrastructure that are responsive to the needs of the domestic and international communities, and that allow transactions involving possible money laundering, terrorist financing and other financial crimes to be detected; (25)

    • Facilitating progress toward a market-oriented economy by reforming commercial laws and other bureaucratic obstacles to attract investment and private sector involvement; (25)

    • Our strategy for victory along the political, security, and economic tracks incorporates every aspect of American power,… (25)

    United States. National Security Council. National Strategy for Victory in Iraq. November 2005. [emphasis in the original]

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