Implementing the Free Market Police State

For the first time since this mission began, we've got a government that will come into power with the expectation that it will sit for four years. You've got a six-month window of opportunity to assist them in putting in place a system that reflects democratic processes in a free market economy. Why do I say six months? Any nation is gong to begin to assert itself after that first six-month period, and will develop habits and processes of its own. Our influence begins to wane a bit.

Lt. Gen. Martin E. Dempsey.

A gun on every street corner, although visually appealing, provides only a short-term solution, and does not equate to long-term security grounded in a democratic process. If there is nothing else done other than kill bad guys and train others to kill bad guys, the only thing accomplished is moving more people from the fence to the insurgent category. There remains no opportunity to grow the supporter base.

Gen. Peter W. Chiarelli.

Thom Shanker and Eric Schmitt, “New Mission for U.S. Division: To Put Iraqi Forces to the Test,” New York Times, 12/18/05.

If a fundamentalist regime is installed in Baghdad…if terrorists secure substantial territory for training and sanctuaries, or if chaos and civil war mark the end of the American intervention,…. …No country within reach of jihad would be spared the consequences of the resulting upheavals sparked by the many individual centers of fanaticism that make up the jihad.

Defeat would shrivel U.S. credibility around the world. Our leadership and the respect accorded to our views on other regional issues from Palestine to Iran would be weakened; the confidence of other major countries -- China, Russia, Europe, Japan -- in America's potential contribution would be diminished. The respite from military efforts would be brief before even greater crises descended on us.

… The better view is that the first fully trained Iraqi units should be seen as increments to coalition forces and not replacements, making possible the deployment of forces toward the frontiers to curtail infiltration, as well as accelerated offensive operations aimed at the guerrilla infrastructure.

… What they fight for will determine how well they fight.

… Real progress will have been made when the Iraqi armed forces view themselves -- and are seen by the population -- as defenders of the nation's interest, not sectarian or regional interests. They will have become a national force when they are able to carry the fight into Sunni areas and grow willing to disarm militias in the Shiite regions from which the majority of them are recruited.

… Americans must accept the reality that their country can never make a total political withdrawal, though the size and location of the military presence will vary. It will always have to meld political and security objectives if the predominance of radical states is to be avoided.

… The developing political institutions in Iraq need to be built into an international and regional system -- not out of obeisance to a theoretical multilateralism but because otherwise America will have to function alone as the permanent policeman, a role that any projected Iraqi government is likely to reject in the long run and that the very debate discussed in this article inhibits.

Henry Kissinger, “How to Exit Iraq,” Washington Post, 12/18/05.